THE ENORMITY of last week’s incidents in Mumbai, and the earlier bombings in several Indian cities, have exposed the ability of terror merchants to strike at civilian targets across the country at will. Every time these incidents happen there are set reactions from those in power. This time, however, the ruling coalition at the Centre and in Mumbai has been forced into accepting their incompetence and insensitivity and they are trying to save themselves from people’s anger by making Shivraj Patil, Vilasrao Deshmukh and R.R. Patil the scapegoats.

One is reminded of the public rage after India’s defeat in the war with China in 1962 when the defence minister, also Jawaharlal Nehru’s blue-eyed boy, V.K. Krishna Menon, was made the target. The pathetic state of India’s armed forces that the war in 1962 exposed and the poor quality of its leadership had turned the searchlight on Jawaharlal Nehru himself.  Two generations later, Congress president Sonia Gandhi has saved her own party’s government by letting her favourite puppet in the home ministry take the blame for a series of security lapses, culminating in the 26/11 incident.

Insensitivity to the tragedy of civilian and military losses was writ large on the behaviour of this generation’s Krishna Menons. Maharashtra chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh took a “filmy” tour around the Taj Mahal Hotel, his deputy R.R. Patil dismissed the attacks as a small incidents that often happen in large cities, and the Union home minister was his usual deadpan n self, unable to put the attacks in perspective. But in a class by himself was the Left leader and Kerala chief minister V.S. Achutananandan when he claimed that but for the NSG Major who died leading the commando team, “even a dog” would not have visited the Unnikrishnan house in Bangalore.

Public anger is fed by the realisation that the government at the Centre has no strategy to tackle the pervasive threat of Islamic fascism. The roots of Islamic fascism are deep and the terrorism that it feeds is a complex phenomenon as one of America’s leading academics, Zbigniew Brezezinski, also national security adviser to President Carter, has pointed out. In our case, the complexity is enhanced by the context. Pakistan is the original inspirer and instigator of jihadi terror, not so much the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The latter was a foster child of Pakistan’s changing regimes, both civilian and military, because terrorism paid political dividends for Pakistan’s rulers. The theory of defeating India by inflicting a “thousand cuts” on its body was the central theme of Pakistan’s policy for the last two decades.

Even though terror groups have begun to bite the very hands that fed them, the new civilian regime in Pakistan can hardly afford to dismantle their camps and block their funds for fear of a fundamentalist backlash and Pakistani people’s adverse reaction. After all, terror groups like the LeT have umbilical links with the Pakistani Army. That connection was exposed when the civilian government had to withdraw its proclaimed intention of bringing the ISI under civilian control. And it was underlined when Pakistan Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani had to backtrack on his assurance to send the ISI chief to India in the wake of 26/11 for a joint consultation.

India is on Pakistan establishment’s radar continually despite the fine words of President Asif Zardari in Delhi recently. The aggressive Pakistani military continues to be a force in Pakistani politics despite the change of regime from military dictatorship to elected civilian rule. And the mindset of the younger generation in Pakistan, created by decades of fundamentalist education, cannot be wiped out despite all the goodwill that has surfaced towards India in the last few months.

It has now been revealed that for several years the Indian government was aware of how vulnerable the Indian coast was to terrorist attacks. But if you ask the government what it did, the answer is a big “zero”. The incompetence of this government is brought out by the fact that it took several hours to transport NSG commandos from Delhi to Mumbai because a plane to carry them was not available.

The level of ineptitude in the Manmohan Singh government is so blatant that despite the intercepts by RAW on the modalities of a sea route attack, no action was taken by the guardians of our coast. Even after the vessel carrying the terrorists was located, the Navy let it off when the occupants flashed fake identity cards.  Such revelations are piling up and the Manmohan Singh government is taking shelter behind another set of assurances and the elimination of a few heads.

In the wake of the 26/11 incidents and government’s abject failure in anticipating them, and inaction even after getting warnings from its own agencies, analysts have quoted from the bipartisan approach that characterises US foreign policy initiatives. Not only the current administration in Washington, but the incoming administration too has rushed to make common cause with India.

But bipartisan approach in India is difficult so long as the Central government is going to deal with jihadi terror wearing velvet gloves. Railway minister Lalu Yadav wanted the then home minister Shivraj Patil to resign. But what about Mr Yadav himself who went to commiserate with Simi activists’ families when several activists from Azamgarh were found involved in serial bombings? Congress minister Kapil Sibal too joined SP’s Amar Singh to demand judicial probe into the Batla House encounter where a brave police officer laid down his life while trying to apprehend terrorists. The Congress, the SP, the Left and others who collectively prop up this government have been apologists for the very people who were found by our agencies to be working in tandem with LeT and Bangladesh’s Huji.

People who are demonstrating against the political class must ponder if it is enough to demand just stern steps against terror. It is equally necessary for our government to be willing to confront the “jihadi mentality” on the strength of which terrorists from outside and inside build their “destruction capsules”.

Balbir K. Punj can be contacted at punjbk@gmail.com

As I write this, the investigation into last week’s terrorist onslaught in Mumbai is well under way. Of course, speculation is rife about who these 10 (or more) militants were, where they were trained and who supplied them with the resources to conduct this atrocity. An unknown group, the Deccan Mujahideen, has claimed responsibility.

However, the gun and grenade tactics used in the Mumbai attack are an all-too-familiar tactic for most Indian analysts, being the trademark of the militant organisations that operate both in, and from, Kashmir. Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the evidence thus far is pointing towards the banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), a group headquartered in Pakistan and with established training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

A number of strategic thinkers have described the Mumbai attacks as a “military-style operation” and they are not too far off the mark. Tactically, most attacks in India have been conducted through the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted in vehicles which are timed or triggered remotely. The exception to this general trend has been the more sophisticated frontal assault tactics used by the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed fidayeen squads in Kashmir between 1999 and 2003, and of course the December 2001 attack on India’s Parliament. Frontal assault tactics, unlike the use of IEDs, require significantly greater degrees of training — including rigorous physical training, arms and ammunition training and, in non-fidayeen attacks, also training in counter-interrogation techniques.

It is clear that the Mumbai terrorists were well-trained in techniques of urban guerrilla warfare and skilled in working in small squads, providing cover, and penetrating set spaces by firing semi-automatic weapons and lobbing grenades in order to ensure large numbers of fatalities in a relatively short duration of time. The fact that these men then proceeded to hole themselves into positions inside all three sites also clearly indicates that no tactical exit strategy was planned, suggesting a typical fidayeen attack where the militant characteristically penetrates a hard or soft target location with the aim of not only causing casualties but also for fighting for as long as possible before being neutralised by the security forces, often specialised military and/or paramilitary units.

Of course, such types of attacks are markedly different from most incidents of international terrorism — and especially terrorism in West Asia — the so-called hub of global jihad. Organisations in the Levant and North Africa have typically used isolated rifle and knife attacks in coordination with archetypical suicide attacks (where the IED is carried on the person as a belt or in a bag) but have traditionally lacked training in urban guerrilla warfare techniques that characterise attacks in Kashmir, Afghanistan and most recently Iraq. Moreover, organisations like Hamas and Hezbollah, despite evidence of external support, have remained essentially localised with strictly limited nationalist aims.

They have also transitioned over time into the political sphere, taking part in the democratic political processes of their respective countries. On the other hand, a whole host of organisations, such as Egypt’s al Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GIA) and Islamic Jihad or the Algerian based Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, have progressively allied, merged or aligned themselves with Al Qaeda over time, a trend that has generated remarkable shifts in the declared goals, tactics and scope of military engagement exercised by these groups.

Al Qaeda, of course, remains exceptional — both in its ideology and in the tactics it employs. Al Qaeda’s messianic ideology is profoundly internationalist and it has consistently attempted to contextualise local conflicts as part of a wider global jihad against apostasy and infidels. Since Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan it has morphed into a more formidable adversary, dispersed across the globe and functioning through a host of self-sustained, semi-independent organisations with whom it loosely shares ideological links and who assimilate its goals and ideology.

This so-called Al Qaeda nebula also includes the LeT, whose goals comprise not only the establishment of a rigid theocratic order in Pakistan but also the hope that violence in Kashmir will promote a wider religious revolution in India. Various intelligence sources have long asserted that LeT was trained in military camps alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

However, more recently LeT’s close ties with Al Qaeda seem to be verified by its increasingly anti-Western stance, its radical internationalism and its movement towards a trans-regional jihad. LeT has been, in the past few years, been identified as not only being a critical recruiting link for operatives in Iraq but as also potentially providing training for the execution of terror attacks in Europe. Various LeT operatives have also been identified as part of the insurgency in Iraq.

So where is all this leading when we look at the recent attacks in India? In Mumbai, while no direct link with Al Qaeda has been established as yet, and may indeed never be, the penetration of at least the Qaeda ideology is clearly reflected in the deliberate targeting of American, British and Israeli nationals — a phenomenon never before seen in India. Indeed the Mumbai tragedy represents the most overt synthesis of Al Qaeda-LeT goals to date as Qaeda’s anti-Western, “anti-infidel state” stance are merged with LeT’s traditional Kashmir/anti-India agenda.

Moreover, it seems that LeT’s involvement in Iraq has certainly taught it some key tactical lessons whereby it has been able to fuse its traditional frontal assault tactic with what are essentially hallmark Al Qaeda tactics. The latter include the use of swarm attacks (coordinated attacks on multiple targets conducted simultaneously by multiple cells), the shift in focus from hard targets (police and military) to soft targets (civilian), focused attacks on economic infrastructure and the use of loose networks (where newly-recruited operatives come together and form a cell for a specific operation). All of these tactics were more than evident in the attack in Mumbai and hint towards the operational evolution of terrorism in South Asia.

In many ways, the Mumbai attacks are the typical doomsday scenario that every democracy fears. The multi-site and mobile attack tactic used by the attackers requires a commando-type response, which in turn calls for largescale investment in not only specialised, sophisticated weaponry but also cadres of highly-trained military and paramilitary response units.

It is obvious that till now the world has failed to recognise or respond to India’s predicament, believing that an isolated, sanction-ridden Pakistan would provide ideal breeding ground for radicalisation in the region. Such an approach has clearly failed. However, the question now is no longer if these militants can be traced back to LeT or Pakistan, but rather how much control the Pakistani government actually exercises over the very proxies that it has sponsored and nurtured over the past 20 years as part of its “bleeding-India-dry by a thousand cuts” foreign policy.

It has been clear for some time now that the new base for global jihad lies in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and that the Pakistani government has a tiger by the tail. In this increasingly volatile and destabilised environment, India has to take a firm stance in order to protect its citizens.

Hurling accusations at Pakistan and brinkmanship, as past experience has shown, is certainly not the answer to fighting non-state actors based on, and operating from, Pakistani territory. Neither is looking towards the international community for support. Instead, India needs to be able to put its own house in order first and take some firm decisions about issues like Kashmir that have simmered on for far too long.

But alongside the various tactical measures that we must take, such as stationing terror-response units across the country, India must also initiate the political and legal reform process that is imperative to address the rapidly evolving international threat from the Al Qaeda franchise. However, these measures and reforms will not only need resources but also, and perhaps more crucially, immense political will.

Dr Rashmi Singh is a fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s decision to send external affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Sri Lanka to press for a ceasefire between forces and the LTTE has an unmistakable parallel with the situation that prevailed in 1987. 

At that time too the Sri Lankan Army was close to overrunning the Jaffna peninsula, which forced the LTTE to approach M. Karunanidhi and the DMK to request the Government of India to intervene. This resulted in actual intervention by India, leading to the Thimpu Accord and the Jayawardhane-Rajiv Gandhi Agreement, endorsed by LTTE supremo Prabhakaran.

As a result of the accord, Tamil was given the same status as the Sinhala language, discrimination against Tamils in job opportunities was withdrawn, and the need for a provincial government headed by a Tamilian for the Tamil homeland in the Northeast of Sri Lanka was also accepted.  Thus, addressing many grievances of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

As part of the accord, the LTTE agreed to surrender arms. And to supervise this, an Indian Peace-Keeping Force went to Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, Prabhakaran violated the agreement and avoided surrendering arms. And when he realised that India would not, under any circumstances, be instrumental in ensuring recognition of an independent Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka, he started doing everything to make it difficult for the IPKF to operate, thereby repaying his debt to India in a brazenly ungrateful manner. 

It was unfortunate that the IPKF got involved, against its wishes, in armed clashes with the LTTE. Although many Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka supported the agreement and were willing to give the Sri Lanka government time to implement provisions of the agreement, the LTTE repudiated it in a clear breach of faith. Not only did they not hesitate to eliminate Tamil leaders of Sri Lanka, but  eventually committed the most reprehensible act — the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, directly under Prabhakaran’s order. This was, indeed, the height of Prabhakaran’s misdeeds.

Thereafter, he openly allied with Sri Lanka Prime Minister Premdasa in demanding the withdrawal of the IPKF and, after withdrawal of the IPKF, had Premdasa assassinated. 
This part of history needs to be retold as once again Prabhakaran is seeking withdrawal of the ban on the LTTE in India. Sri Lanka’s Army has once again shown remarkable success in its operation against the LTTE. It has captured nearly all the approaches to the Jaffna peninsula and is close to the doors of Prabhakaran’s den. And India is facing general elections soon. It is in this situation that Prabhakaran has started his old game of putting pressure on DMK in Tamil Nadu, to help persuade the Sri Lankan Army to call off their offensive and to ease the pressure on Jaffna. 

India will be extremely short-sighted once again if it commits the mistake of dealing with Prabhakaran. We must not forget how Prabhakaran eliminated all his “rival” Tamil politicians in Sri Lanka. Whatever be the pressure that Tamil politicians are facing, no trust should be placed on Prabhakaran or the LTTE, one of the most notorious killing squads in the world which has no scruples about entering into an agreement and then repudiating it at their convenience. No negotiations should be started with the LTTE unless they replace Prabhakaran with a moderate leader. 

We should also remember that all Tamilians in Sri Lanka are not followers of the LTTE. Many of them want to live happily with their Sinhala friends. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka has an element of jingoism which rises to the surface whenever they are near success. A typical case in point was the unfortunate statement recently made by the Army chief that Sri Lanka means a Sinhala nation, ignoring that the Tamils have been living in Sri Lanka for several generations and that when westerners came to Sri Lanka they took over from the island’s Tamilian king. 

Thus both, the Sinhalese and the Tamilians, need to show a that they are willing and ready to live and let live. Discrimination against Tamil population should stop and the Tamil-dominated Northeast should be given complete provincial autonomy. In return, Tamil leaders should express their faith in one indivisible Sri Lanka. India can be the biggest guarantee of such a unified, multi-racial Sri Lanka.

After India established diplomatic relations with Russia more than 60 years ago, the two nations have remained close friends. The relationship has been further consolidated through cooperation in many fields. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed in 1971, was the cornerstone of the strategic relationship between India and Russia. More specifically, military-technical relations were among the first major areas of cooperation that began in 1960.

Indo-Russian defence cooperation derives from our strategic relationship. There are many projects that are currently in operation; some examples are the Brahmos project and the licensed production of T-90 tanks for the Indian Army, SU-30 for the Indian Air Force and MIG-29K for the Indian Navy. There are also many other projects on the anvil.

Notwithstanding the acrimonious debate surrounding the renovation and re-equipping of Admiral Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya), it is still an important part of our acquisition programme. There are other joint projects involving modernisation of ships, joint designing and production of fifth-generation fighter aircraft and GLONASS navigation system which are at various stages of negotiations.

An honest assessment of the current state of Indo-Russian defence cooperation would indicate that while it continues to be robust in most areas, no new areas have been included. Bulk activities still centre around purchase of hardware and dealing with issues related to maintenance back-up. This is not altogether surprising because the Indian armed forces still continue to hold large inventories of Russian equipment. That, however, has had the undesirable effect of maintaining the interaction at a buyer-seller level rather than that as strategic partnership. Even areas that promised to elevate the relationship to the level of strategic partnership appear to be mired in many a conditionality and restrictions.

Take the Brahmos project for instance: in spite of successes achieved, not much progress has been made either in increased production or export to third countries. One reason, it appears, is that there has been no meaningful transfer of technologies involved.

 It is essential that technologies are transferred by respective Russian industries to their Indian counterparts so that the weapon system could be manufactured in India, making it competitive in the world arms market. India’s threshold in cutting-edge technologies may be low; however, its manufacturing base is sound and, in many areas, comparable to the best in the world. In software development too Indian companies are competitive.

Surely common ground could be found for substantial and meaningful Indian participation in production of defence equipment. This is not to say that there has been no interaction at the strategic level. Agreement to lease an Akula class nuclear powered submarine is probably a unique example of defence cooperation anywhere in the world.

 Joint development of fifth-generation fighter is another sterling example. For these and other similar endeavours to continue, there should be no hesitation in sharing technology and training. During his visit to India in January 2007, Vladimir Putin the then Russian President, had said: “The strategic relationship between India and Russia has served not only in the long term national interests of both countries but has also contributed effectively to stability and security in Asia and the world in general.”

Given the fact that Indo-Russian relations have withstood the test of time and tribulations, it is not unrealistic to suggest that Indo-Russian defence cooperation should be raised to the level of security cooperation. It would then not restrict the relationship to cooperation in terms of military equipment and technology but include the wider scope of issues that concern the security of both the nations. We should build on some of our joint strategic enterprises like the Akula, GLONASS and FGA and take our security relationship a few notches higher.

Some areas which are part of India’s extended neighbourhood such as Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics and Iran, are also part of Russia’s extended neighbourhood. Stability of Central Asia is strategically significant for India’s security and is important to Russia for similar reasons. Perhaps, architecture for possible regional cooperative security to include Central Asia could be developed through discussion. The extended neighbourhood offers the possibilities for consultations between Russia and India to take complementary positions on various issues concerning Central Asian countries.

Another area where Russia and India could evolve a strategic framework is in development of counter-terrorist strategy. Maritime terrorism, including piracy, is also a shared concern. The Russian and Indian navies could cooperate in the north and west Arabian Sea region, particularly off the coast of Somalia. Besides sharing intelligence about activities of terrorists (pirates), the two navies could benefit from each other’s logistics facilities and operational support.

Activities of the Indian Navy have increased significantly in the recent months; however, the Russian Navy has long experience of operating in the area. It would increase the reach and endurance of Indian naval vessels operating in the area. In fact the two navies could share the responsibilities and economise on effort. Indo-Russian defence cooperation is established on sound foundation and has persevered through many a challenge. Some priorities may have undergone changes but the basis of the relationship continues to be strong. It is time to take this relationship to the next logical level — to security cooperation.

India will need to exercise care in dealing with its new relationships such as that with US to ensure that it is not at the cost of the regional priorities, particularly its historic relationship with Russia. On its part Russia will need to be more forthcoming in terms of sharing its technological know-how with India if our relationship is to be taken to the next level. The forthcoming visit of the Russian President provides a good opportunity to take it to a new, higher level.

Lt. Gen. V.G. Patankar (Retd) is a former GOC, 15 Corps, Kashmir Valley

I believe in God. I feel that there is a power which controls our life.  But I also believe that whatever we get in this life is according to our karmas in our past births.  No matter how hard a person works, he or she will get only what he or she is destined to get.  I feel doing good deeds is important. If you can’t help then at least don’t harm anyone.  Live and let live is my mantra.  But there are lots of questions unanswered like why the worst human beings are the most successful, and why while one person gets success instantly, another innocent person gets killed in bomb blasts.

I am spiritual and religious in my own way, and that is because of the family I come from.
I visit temples occasionally but I don’t follow any norms except praying before I sleep. I pray to God when I am happy and content.  I chant mantras and also read Hanuman Chalisa and other spiritual books. At times, when things don’t go my way, I fight with Him. At the same time, when my wish is granted, I thank Him with all my heart.

— Maushmi Udeshi is a well-known model